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boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea: a preliminary 
assessment 
 
Fotios Fitsilis* and Stelios Stavridis† 
 
ABSTRACT  
There is growing academic attention to both parliamentary diplomacy and to parliamentary 
digital communication in recent years. Yet, the study of Greek parliamentary diplomacy 
remains an under-researched topic. The paper brings together these two dimensions by 
considering the following case study: the Hellenic Parliament´s reactions to the November 
2019 Turkey-Libya (internationally recognized government) Memorandum of Understanding 
on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea. To do so, this study will address the 
following key research question: has the Hellenic Parliament as an institution adopted new 
technologies and data openness to promote its parliamentary diplomacy? There is new 
literature widely expecting that parliaments do so, but, to date, there is little empirical 
evidence to that effect. This paper attempts to close this gap by investigating which digital 
tools were utilized in an effort to defend and promote Greece´s stance on that issue 
between November 2019 and March 2020. 
Keywords: Hellenic Parliament, Greek parliamentary diplomacy, digital media, Turkish-
Libyan MoU, maritime boundaries 
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Important technological developments in digital communication have greatly impacted the 
daily running of governance institutions and processes throughout the world (Mansell, 
2012; Milakovich, 2012; Fitsilis, 2019). In particular, parliamentary organisations have 
incorporated innovative methods in their organisational culture and novel technologies into 
their working procedures (Hoff, 2004; Leston-Bandeira, 2007; Griffith, 2010). The 
international role of parliamentary actors has also greatly developed over the years, but 
whereas respective existing literatures on these subjects have grown fast (for reviews, see 
Parts 2 and 3 below), there is little overlap between the two, let alone dedicated case 
studies.   
As there is also very little general academic interest in Greek parliamentary diplomacy, this 
study will assess how and why digital technologies have contributed (or can contribute) to 
the Hellenic Parliament´s diplomacy. This paper will bridge this gap by analysing a specific 
case study. Indeed, it will investigate which digital media the Hellenic Parliament (or the 
‘Vouli’ in Greek) has utilised in an effort to defend and promote Greece´s stance on a 
particular issue: the 27 November 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.  
The authors have used the following method to generate a dataset for this particular 
investigation. The dataset consists of parliamentarian statements (see Appendix) that 
appeared in digital parliamentary media during the period of interest for our study, i.e.: 
between November 2019 and March 2020. The latter date corresponds with the beginning 
of the institutional lockdown due to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, when all 
parliamentary functions were put on hold. As most statements also debated other issues 
not immediately relevant to the 2019 Turkey-Libya MoU, particular care has been taken to 
isolate the directly relevant part of the message analysed, without altering its central 
meaning. The roles of the parliamentarians making the statements as well as the venue or 
occasion where they have been expressed were also studied.  
Since Ministers may also be parliamentarians, their interventions have been taken into 
account whenever made within a parliamentary set-up, be it national or international. As for 
the digital media screened for these statements during the above period, they consisted of 
the following: the official Vouli web page, the YouTube channel of the parliamentary TV 
station, the official Twitter account, as well as two special information actions, Global 
Hellenism News, and the parliamentary e-Magazine. Analysis goes along two main paths: 
qualitative, by discussing the implications of single statements on parliamentary diplomacy, 
and quantitative, by collectively studying significant attributes of the statements captured – 
for instance the digital medium they appeared, the timing of expression, the role of the 
parliamentarians involved and even the use of language.  
Together with this introduction, the paper consists of six parts. The next one (Part 2) 
contextualises our study by presenting the state of play in general parliamentary diplomacy 
and in the use of digital technologies in parliamentary diplomacy. Part 3 then presents the 
Hellenic Parliament´s digital communication means and instruments. The next two parts 
focus on the actual case study:  Part 4 offers a background to 2019 Turkey-Libya MoU on 
maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea. Part 5 then provides a descriptive analysis 
of what digital means the Vouli has used in its reactions to the MoU. Part 6 concludes with 




understanding of parliamentary diplomacy means, especially the use of new digital 




2. Digital technology advances: a ‘revolution’ for (political) 
communication 
This part presents an overview of digital technological changes and their impact on political 
communication. First, technology advances and their effects on representative institutions 
are discussed from the data openness point of view, before considering digital media and 
their impact on political communication. This precedes the discussion of the evolution of 
digital (parliamentary) diplomacy, which constitutes the main focus of the present 
contribution. 
 
2.1. Digital technology developments and parliaments 
There follows a review of how technological advances in digital communication affect 
parliamentary practice. Parliamentary functions rely on the existence and exchange of 
information (data). Data analysis is vital for a successful parliamentary participation in 
international commissions and forums. Moreover, parliamentarians need to communicate 
in a meaningful way with their relevant stakeholders, such as diplomats, journalists, interest 
groups and the general public – both domestically and externally. Parliamentary diplomacy, 
widely defined, is no exception to this need for a sophisticated use of information. Indeed, 
open parliamentary data and relevant advanced algorithms for processing and visualisation 
have the potential to open up new dimensions in parliamentary diplomacy. These new 
technologies can facilitate this practice. 
In his 2013 study dealing with why and what data should be open and how multi-
stakeholder efforts can help parliaments achieve those goals, Granickas (2013) argues that 
recent technological developments, and in particular those in digitalisation, mean that de 
facto parliamentary informatics is a welcomed development. In particular, parliamentary 
transparency gains not only in feasibility but also in desirability: 
‘Why open parliament data? The growth of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) offers unique opportunities to explore ever-closer relationships and interaction 
between governments and the people in modern democracies. There is no technology-
related barrier remaining to engage citizens in decision-making processes and also truly 
ensure citizens’ right to information. (...) Parliaments, as representative bodies of 
governments, should be and often are on the frontline of encouraging provision and re-use 
of open data. They are in a good position to benchmark openness standards for other 
institutions as well as to improve open, accessible, transparent and accountable 
representation.’ (Granickas, 2013, p. 3, note omitted) 
Fitsilis (2019) argues that, in addition, it is important for parliaments to be as active as 
possible in being part of these new technological processes. He goes as far as to maintain 
that a specific regulatory framework (e.g.: through legislation or ‘soft law’) needs to be 




insisted on the fact that legislation always tends to follow technological developments 
(Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2020). In other words, the real choice now –as in the past– is 
between letting new technology de facto create some sort of self-regulation or, instead, 
actively decide to ex-ante develop a relevant regulatory framework. Thus, the still limited 
literature on parliamentary communication in the digital age has produced interesting 
findings that are summarised in what follows. 
In modern democratic political systems and societies, achieving transparency is a dynamic 
process that requires a constant evaluation and implementation of communication 
initiatives. Parliaments are key actors in that process. As parliaments work to engage with 
their respective people and media, no communication plan can be one-size-fits-all. Citizens 
have a unique set of needs and capabilities based on historical experiences and present 
realities, and, as a result, parliaments should reflect these complexities. Nonetheless, a 
citizen engagement strategy will almost always include some fundamental elements.  
In democracies, ‘[o]pen communication allows for a state and its citizens to engage in a 
reciprocal dialogue’ (Loewenberg 2009, p. 167). In the parliamentary context, open 
communication may represent a novel approach of conceptualising and presenting core 
parliamentary roles: it requires parliaments to develop communication strategies that will 
enable them to both educate and inform citizens about their affairs and operation of their 
working bodies. Moreover, it can encourage greater public engagement by adopting direct 
channels of communication with customised packages of information. Key issues for 
successfully communicating parliamentary information include: language –as the official 
language of the parliament is not easy to comprehend for citizens at large–, accessibility to 
all initiatives undertaken (e.g.: for people with disabilities), and the relationship with the 
media, as these facilitate information flows and assist in closing communication gaps 
between citizens and Parliament that often exist in practice (Griffith, 2010, p. 27). Griffith 
and Leston-Bandeira (2012) offer an overview of conditions for the deployment of new 
media by parliaments.  
It needs to be noted that our understanding of the relations between parliament and 
citizens in the new digital media landscape might be still limited (Leston-Bandeira, 2012), 
while Dai and Norton (2007, p. 344) have pointed out at the danger for new technologies to 
“exacerbating existing participating and engagement gaps in the parliamentary system”. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong need for Parliaments to re-connect with citizens and the 
greater public. The reasons for this are manifold. In parliaments, politics is being debated. At 
the same time, parts of society are being detached from political processes, mainly due to 
the lack of accountability and transparency (Auel and Raunio, 2014, discuss 
public parliamentary accountability in the case of EU politics). In addition, in the era of the 
social web, several representative institutions still struggle with openness and the use of 
new communication channels to reach out to citizens (IPU, 2019). Moreover, in times of 
crises, which in the past years have rather become the rule than the exception, the 
executive branch takes the institutional lead, thus distorting the institutional equilibrium 
(Fitsilis et al., 2020). Without proper countermeasures, parliaments risk gliding into 
insignificance in the general consciousness.  
One way to re-connect with the public is to take actions that will enable citizens to re-affirm 
the fact that parliaments, regional or national, are legitimate bodies of democratic debate, 
and, that Members of Parliament (MPs), and they alone, are primarily entrusted by their 




and, as such, the government, both in its management of daily business and in its definition 
of future policy, has an obligation to be accountable to the parliament, as parliamentary 
control over governmental actions constitutes an essential element of democracy. But in 
order for interactive communication via digital media to firmly re-link citizens and 
parliaments, it needs to be regarded as an “integrated feature of the democratic political 
process” (Coleman, 2006, p. 384).   
As such, Parliament has to utilise every opportunity to present a positive but also accurate 
image of both itself as an institution and of its own proceedings to help overcome public 
apathy, disenchantment, dissatisfaction, or even ignorance. For a parliament, traditional 
advertising and marketing evaluations, such as TV viewing ratings, might have little 
relevance.3 Content of premium quality and diversity and community outreach are far more 
significant concepts. For this, direct channels of communication between the public and the 
parliament are necessary. Indicatively, traditional printed media, radio, TV and Web-TV 
broadcasts, the parliamentary website, emailing lists and the use of social media all belong 
to such channels. It needs to be noted that public hearings, parliamentary sessions and 
other similar actions are considered parliamentary activities rather than dedicated 
communication channels. At the institutional level, the messages are usually generated and 
distributed through a parliamentary press office (short: press office).4 Contrary to this 
centralised parliamentary communication model, there are also decentralised ones that 
allow for distinct parliamentary bodies to make use of digital media, such as, for instance, in 
the case of the House of Commons (UK).5  
The press office, whose description and challenges are notably absent in the literature, 
operates inside the parliament and is usually attached to its Speaker. It cooperates with 
national and international media, covering for instance the activities of the presidium 
(Speaker and deputy Speakers), official participation in international forums, as well as 
significant publications, exhibitions, educational programs and issues of national 
importance. Through various initiatives and multiple channels, the press office constantly 
interacts with society ensuring public access to parliamentary information, while at the 
same time protecting the institution by responding to various controversies presented by 
media. Its announcements make use of journalistic rather than official legal language norms, 
hence being more understandable by the wider public. A general presentation of the main 
digital communication channels is presented next.  
 
2.2. Digital communication and its channels  
During the past decade, parliaments worldwide have started to operate in a more 
transparent and engaging manner. The use of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) for the facilitation of parliamentary work among working bodies, MPs, administrative 
units and parliamentary personnel have contributed in many ways, such as the creation and 
implementation of e-services enhancing collaboration among related stakeholders, the 
 
3 For instance, Vouli TV, the parliamentary television channel at the Hellenic Parliament, is not included in TV 
ratings.  
4 This is the case in the Hellenic Parliament that is discussed herein.  
5 As of 2019, there were 42 Twitter accounts managed by the UK´s House of Commons related to different 
committees and administrative units, such as parliamentary television (parliamentlive.tv) and archives, 
https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/foi/foi-and-eir/commons-foi-disclosures/information-




fostering of many-to-many communications, and the automation of required procedures 
(see, indicatively, Hoff, 2004; Leston-Bandeira, 2007; 2019; Romanelli, 2016; Fitsilis et al., 
2017). Digital communication channels provided novel ways to interact with the citizens. 
Moreover, they enable a higher degree of understanding among the two parties, i.e. citizens 
and public officials, in this context, the MPs. This has to do with the enhanced channel 
parameterisation that is possible, such as the choice between one-way or two-way 
communication and the range of options that are available to members or institutions to 
process and tackle comments or questions by the public, hence being able to form policies 
based on these comments (Griffith, 2010, p. 19). 
Understanding the nature of communication and how it takes place on the web sphere is a 
crucial factor for forming a parliamentary web communication strategy and related policies. 
In particular, dissemination of information and subsequent communication between 
parliaments and citizens is achieved through:  
− parliamentary websites (e.g. Hamajoda, 2016); 
− digital platforms (e.g. social media and webTV);  
− blended channels (e.g. social media and website; website and face-to-face 
interaction in the physical environment of the parliament building) (Papaloi et al., 
2012);  
− media-mix, with the use of both traditional media (printing, e-mailing, SMS) and 
contemporary ones fostering the ability for sharing content among users, and 
therefore, enhancing discussion and subsequent participation.  
Since its beginnings, Television (TV) remains one of the most efficient communication 
channels for parliament (Hill, 1993; IPU-EBU-ASGP, 2007). In the digital era, TV broadcasting 
went digital over dedicated platforms, giving the public direct access to information, as 
television extends the ability of representative institutions to potentially reach out to the 
entire nation –and the world, when referring to web broadcasting–. According to an IPU 
survey, 55% of parliaments have broadcast channels and 62% provide use web broadcasting 
IPU, 2019, p. 64). TV broadcasting opened-up new perspectives to citizens, organisations 
and other interested stakeholders who want to be informed on specific legislative and 
oversight processes. Citizens become more than simple spectators and journalists are no 
longer the sole analysts of parliamentary news. Hence, while some saw it merely as an 
instrument for mobilising popular support (Mughan and Swarts, 1997, p. 48), TV (and 
webTV) broadcasting gradually become a vital tool for reconciling society with democracy.  
In addition, the existence of parliamentary websites and the publishing of information 
related to parliamentary operations and processes have raised public and civil society 
interest calling for dialogue and transparency (Setälä and Grönlund, 2006; IPU, 2009; 
Bernandes and Leston-Bandeira, 2016). The task of building and establishing a sustainable 
communication policy either online or offline is a multi-part effort requiring an array of 
factors to be taken into account such as:  
− a political decision on the degree level of openness;  
− setting objectives for communication with citizens and their engagement;  
− coordination among relevant administrative units;  




− interoperability among communication channels;6  
− a communication strategy that points out at the desired communication-mix.7 
The nature of social media is different from that of other communication channels because 
communication is interactive. As such, various ‘actions’ and ‘reactions’ are received and 
transmitted in an unprecedented manner (e.g. in real time), compared to older forms of 
communication, such as TV, radio or printed media. In relation to institutional actors like 
parliaments, the use of social media enables instant communication of any given message 
with citizens, albeit in a more ‘informal’ manner, as the enactment of some official 
documents is still made via traditional and sometimes time-consuming procedures, such as 
publishing in official gazettes. At the same time, omnidirectionality allows citizens to express 
their opinion directly to the parliament. Forwarding to other citizens can make certain 
announcements ‘go viral’, in the social media jargon, hence quickly reaching out to great 
numbers of recipients. Furthermore, there are no ‘middlemen’ between citizens and 
parliaments, which implies that the message is delivered in the most direct manner possible. 
What is more, given the capacity to do so is there, parliament has the opportunity to 
respond to such comments and even engage in a discussion. Yet, special attention and rules 
of conduct are necessary to avoid this kind of ‘online accountability’ undermine the status of 
the institution (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Fuchs, 2017).  
Issues such as communication style, marketing and dissemination of information indicate 
the complexity, but also the challenging, character of social media related communication 
channels. As it is the case with traditional media, social media also require a technical 
expertise to be used efficiently in the parliamentary context. The appointment of dedicated, 
educated and well-supported social media managers needs to be considered. Their 
expertise should be both institutional and technical, in the sense that they need to 
understand political and decision-making processes, while also having knowledge of 
marketing, social media analytics and ideally search engine optimisation techniques. Tuten 
(2020) offers in-depth information on how to optimise the use of social media. 
When it comes to parliaments, social media open up a new terrain in the interaction with 
the public, calling institutions to re-evaluate their communication strategy and policy 
(Kindra and Stapenhurst, 2010; Griffith and Leston-Bandeira, 2012; IPU, 2013; Williamson, 
2013; Allen et al., 2013). At the same time, most social media are free of charge and offer a 
space for information and education to the public, which can be a cost-saving opportunity in 
terms of a parliament, often with budgetary restrictions. The available information can 
reach more recipients via social media and via sharing than through a usual communication 
channel. This can be achieved through existing social media as well as by adding widgets for 
sharing or tweeting specific positions on the website. Established social networks of the 
likes of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube can serve as mediators in establishing constructive 
relations with other state bodies, civil society and non-governmental organisations. ‘Liking’ a 
page and getting notifications of a state body, subscribing to its YouTube channel, tweeting 
a message from a non-governmental organisation that seems useful to the parliament and 
its followers, all can pave the way for building up strong inter-institutional and societal links. 
 
6 e.g.: traditional and offline communication with citizens and the use of web 1.0, web 2.0 and -in the near 
future- of the semantic web (web 3.0). 
7 e.g.: the selection of the suitable ICT tools and methods (both traditional and contemporary) to tackle target 




Efficient utilisation of the available digital channels needs to be encompassed in a web 
communication strategy and the related action plan, also called communication plan. One 
should also bear in mind that achieving a successful web communication policy requires a 
constant effort because ‘[s]trategic planning must be viewed as an ongoing process that 
engages all major stakeholders within the parliament’ (Griffith, 2010, p. 23). Achieving a 
digital communication plan that fosters transparency and citizen participation is dependent 
on political decisions or setting objectives through an agreed-upon plan. On top of these, 
there are additional issues that e-parliaments needs to encompass, such as inclusion, 
awareness, engagement, higher quality of information and greater access to parliamentary 
documents (UNDP, 2006; IPU, 2019).  
In practice, usability and accessibility issues can significantly determine users’ experience 
and affect their engagement, as well as the degree of openness and transparency. This 
would include, for instance, the decision on how parliamentary information is provided and 
presented to users via a website, the choice of formats for sharing information, e.g. csv, 
XML, via a dedicated API, eventual graphical representation8 and the presence of widgets 
and their placement on the website. Factors such as internet penetration, digital literacy, 
and public opinion on the institution play a vital role in order to define and structure any 
sustainable communication strategy. 
 
2.3. Impact on parliamentary diplomacy 
Why impact new technologies on diplomacy and, especially, parliamentary diplomacy? The 
wider technology developments described in the previous part have a profound effect on 
diplomacy which is captured by the term ‘digital diplomacy’. Around digital diplomacy there 
is a body of rapidly expanding literature that in fact proves a strong interrelation between 
two formerly distant worlds in science and politics, digital technology and diplomacy. 
Exclusively on digital diplomacy, the savvy reader may refer to Bjola and Holmes (2015), 
Adesina (2017), Bjola (2019), and Bjola and Zaiotti (2020). Nonetheless, this is still an under-
researched topic where several operational models are employed (Manor, 2016), while 
apparently the benefits seem to outnumber any risks (Rashica, 2018). In the light of the 
above, analysing effectiveness of digital diplomacy remains a challenge. However, new 
computational methods may offer reliable insights (Park et al., 2019). 
Naturally, technology –or aspects thereof– also affects parliamentary diplomacy. Hocking 
and Melissen (2015), Gilboa (2016) and Rigalt (2017) argue that this is so because these new 
technologies affect directly the question of data openness. They represent means that 
facilitate, on the one hand, a democratisation of parliamentary input in foreign policy, and, 
on the other, a connection with citizens, which is the other side of the same coin: 
parliaments as transmission belts between the government and the governed. 
The international role of parliamentary actors has greatly developed over the years. As a 
result, there is also growing academic interest in that respect (Raunio and Wagner, 2018; 
Malamud and Stavridis, 2011), be it on parliamentary diplomacy (Stavridis and Jancic, 2017; 
Stavridis, 2019; Ferrero, 2019), the expansion of International Parliamentary Institutions 
 
8 See Hansard at Huddersfield project of the University of Huddersfield, a project that aims to make 
accessible ‘the official, substantially verbatim report of what was said in both houses of Parliament between 
1803-2020 through various search functions and interactive visualisations.’ More information available at: 




(IPIs) (Cofelice, 2019), without forgetting more traditional attention paid to ‘technical’ inter-
parliamentary cooperation (García Chourio, 2019). This (inter-)parliamentary framework is 
particularly visible in Europe with a proliferation of IPIs (Raube, Müftüler-Baç and Wouters, 
2019). It is within that multi-layer context that Greek parliamentary diplomacy in general 
and that of the Hellenic Parliament in particular should be considered. 
Examples of diplomatic practices date back to ancient times. In the modern Westphalian 
world, it amounts to ‘a dialogue between (independent) states’: ‘the process of dialogue 
and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their 
purposes by means short of war’ (Watson, 1982, p. 10). 
Barston (2019, p. 2) lists ‘information and communication’ and ‘international negotiation’ as 
two key diplomatic areas. These dimensions are of particular relevance to our study. Indeed, 
as new actors have appeared, thus developing new forms of diplomatic interaction in a 
post-Westphalian world, there are nowadays many types of diplomacy, e.g. economic, 
cultural, celebrity, sports, gastronomic, religious, humanitarian, scientific, and of course, 
parliamentary - which often overlap in many ways and forms (Davenport, 2002; Cooper et 
al., 2013; Constantinou et al., 2016).  
The existing literature also shows that there are many examples of parliamentary diplomacy 
efforts towards finding solutions to potential or real international conflicts (Beetham, 2006). 
Indeed, as two Dutch parliamentarians, Weisglas and de Boer (2007, p. 93) have put it: 
parliamentarians develop a more flexible and informal approach because ‘[t]hey are 
representatives of a people, [and] (…) their actions do not necessarily commit a 
government, which can make it easier for them to operate in particularly sensitive 
situations’.  
 
3. The impact of digital revolution on the Vouli´s parliamentary 
diplomacy 
3.1. The Hellenic Parliament’s digital communication 
After discussing the nature of channels and other digital dimensions of communications, the 
impact of digital developments on parliaments and on parliamentary diplomacy in general, 
the paper now turns to the Greek case.  
The Hellenic Parliament connects with media representatives through a press office and a 
media/press gallery, the services of its communication directorate and its television 
channel, in order to promote its various parliamentary activities and provide substantial 
information to media and citizens. A great deal of these activities is broadcasted online. To 
achieve that goal, the role of digital media is of particular significance. 
All Hellenic Parliament media outlets try to promote activities in order to include the public, 
both within the country and abroad, in a democratic process, with activities, such as open 
days, guided tours and conferences, as well as TV programs on legislative work, 
parliamentary and political history. Other examples of recent related initiatives are: 
− thoughts for an all-new parliamentary portal; 





− various parliamentary events and conferences; 
− the creation of a newsletter and a mini-portal, www.diaspora.parliament.gr, 
published both in Greek and English, addressed to the Greek Diaspora;9 
− τhe creation of a regular (twice a month) parliamentary e-Magazine issued by 
the press office called “Επί του …Περιστυλίου!” [Greek for “On 
the…Peristyle!”]10 with reports on parliamentary, political and cultural issues.  
The press office and all communication outlets of the Hellenic Parliament have on a daily 
basis direct interaction with accredited media representatives. Such communication is 
conducted to avoid misunderstandings, provide further information and enhance access to 
intra-parliamentary information. These close links with journalists can be particularly useful 
in times of crises, such as the one described in this paper. 
The following ones are the main digital communication channels of the Hellenic Parliament 
that have been assessed in the context of the present study:   
− official web page;11  
− parliamentary TV channel;12  
− Twitter (@PressParliament); 
− Global Hellenism News website and newsletter;13  
− “Epi ... tou peristiliou!” e-Magazine.14  
 
3.2 Greek parliamentary diplomacy: the wider context 
There is very little research on Greek parliamentary diplomacy, especially in English. Most 
studies (in Greek) on the international relations of the Vouli date back to the early 2000s, 
and often are rather descriptive (Gkikas, 2003; Karabarbounis, Mastaka and Dalis, 2004; 
Karabarbounis, 2005).  
Stavridis (2018, pp. 5-6) summarises the most significant instruments that the Vouli 
possesses in foreign policy and maps internal bodies and stakeholders. In addition, he 
mentions the main parliamentary assemblies to which the Vouli dispatches delegations.15 
 
9 The Greek Diaspora (ὁμογένεια [Omogenia], see: hellenicnews.com/category/news/omogenia-national-
issues/) is given particular attention as it is very important for Greece: there is an estimated 7 million Greeks 
who live outside Greece, when the latter´s population is just under 11 million. There exist numerous 
organisations dealing with the Greek Diaspora, including formal ones: a World Council of Greeks Abroad (SAE), a 
General Secretariat of Hellenes Abroad, and, at the parliamentary level, the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary 
Association (WHIA). This forum was initially set up by the Greek government but it is the Vouli that steers it. On 
the WHIA, see Stavridis (2020). 
10 A peristyle is an alternative architectural term of Greek origin for colonnade. 
11 The press releases are visible in a dedicated news box: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Grafeio-
Typou/Deltia-Typou. 
12 The Hellenic Parliament TV channel (VouliTV) also broadcasts online; its archives may be found on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/hellenicparliamenttv. 
13 This newsletter is being managed by the Directorate for International Affairs: https://diaspora.parliament.gr/. 
14 This e-Magazine is being published since July 2020 by the press office and hence its assessment did not 
produce any results.   
15 These are the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Inter–Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Council of Europe 




Other multilateral arrangements, particularly in the context of the European Union (EU), are 
also in place, such as the Conference of the Committees of the national Parliaments of the 
European Union Member States (COSAC) and the Conference of the Speakers of the EU 
Parliaments. At the regional level, just to mention two of the most significant inter-
parliamentary institutions (IPIs), the Vouli belongs to the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Mediterranean (PAM) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (PABSEC). Moreover, as of early 2021, during the18th parliamentary period, 78 
parliamentary friendship groups cover for bilateral parliamentary diplomacy issues with 
parliaments from all five continents.16  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to holistically study the use of digital media for 
parliamentary diplomacy purposes across all actors and bodies of the Hellenic Parliament. 
Instead, this paper tries to bridge this important gap in the literature from a specific 
perspective: that of the digital media and related technologies.  
 
4. The context and content of the 2019 Turkish Government-Libyan 
Government of National MoU 
Before focusing on the parliamentary diplomacy case study, this part contextualises it: what 
is the content of the 2019 Turkish Government-Libyan Government of National MoU (the 
term “agreement” is used interchangeably).  
On 27 November 2019, the Turkish Government and the (internationally recognised) Tripoli-
based Libyan Government of National Accord (since 2015 and led by Fayez al-Sarraj) signed 
in Istanbul a Memorandum of Understanding17 to delimitate their supposed maritime 
boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea (see also Oruç, 2019). As per the MoU, the two 
jurisdictions have established an 18.6 nautical miles boundary - both for Exclusive Economic 
Zone, as well as the Continental Shelf - just southeast of Crete. It creates a new maritime 
border delimitation that links the Turkish territorial waters with those of Libya (Bozkurt, 
2019). The important aspect of such an agreement is that, first and foremost, it attempts to 
delineate the vision of Turkey in terms of how the allocation of maritime zones should be 
done in the Mediterranean. 
Islands in the Aegean Sea are not taken into consideration for the delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf and this is clearly shown by the fact that large islands, such as Crete, 
Rhodes and Karpathos are not considered at all, notably in their right to a 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea, as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
customary law. Thus, the supposed Turkish continental shelf starts 6 nautical miles off the 
Greek coast, and, as a consequence, it disregards the possibility for islands of any right to 
possess a continental shelf.18,19 It totally ignores the existence of several Greek islands in 
 
16 General information about the parliamentary diplomacy activities of the Hellenic Parliament can be accessed 
through the dedicated link at the parliament’s portal: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Diethneis-
Drastiriotites (last accessed: 19/1/2021). 
17 Its official name is: ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Government of National Accord – State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the 
Mediterranean’. 
18 UNCLOS article 121.2. ‘Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the 




doing so, and therefore infringes on Greek territorial waters and its EEZ (also related with 
the questions of Cyprus´ EEZ, hydrocarbons, non-recognition).20  
The Greek reaction was to declare the MoU ‘null and void’, to lodge a complaint to the UN, 
and to expel the Libyan ambassador from Athens (Reuters, 2019). In addition, less than a 
month after the MoU was signed, Aguila Saleh Issa, the President of the Libyan House of 
Representatives based since 2014 in Tobruk – under the control of Haftar, visited Athens 
and met with the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, a very important and symbolic 
meeting. 
As briefly mentioned in Part 2 above, Greek decision-making including its parliamentary 
dimension, now takes place in a fully developed multi-layer, multi-level context. Therefore, 
it is also important to discuss the EU reaction. Replying to a December 2019 MEP written 
question by an Italian MEP on the subject, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy Josep Borrell responded on 24 February 2020 as follows:  
‘(…) on 12 December 2019, the European Council [of the European Union] 
stressed that the Turkey-Libya memorandum of understanding on the delimitation of 
maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights 
of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any 
legal consequences for third States’ (To Vima, 2020; European Parliament, 2020). 
 
5. Greek parliamentary reactions to the Agreement: a descriptive 
analysis 
As noted above, the agreement was met with fierce resistance and opposition from many 
countries, especially Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, Cyprus, Syria, Israel, 
and Egypt, as well as the Tobruk-Based Libyan House of Representatives. In a similar way, 
after the signing of said agreement, the Hellenic Parliament reacted in various ways and at 
different levels. What follows first offers a descriptive account of a series of statements on 
the matter made by the Speaker, Committee representatives, as well as individual MPs, 
followed by an analysis of the digital dimension. These statements were issued on several 
occasions within Greece, but also before institutions of the EU, NATO and the United 
Nations (UN). The full list of statements, original and as a translation can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
5.1. Traditional means  
Just a few days after the announcement of the agreement, on 1 December 2019, 
Constantine Tassoulas, the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, while answering a question 
regarding this important development, commented on the provocative nature of the 
 
19 ‘The process of delimitation involved establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining 
to the coastal State and not the determination de novo of such an area. […] the rights of the coastal State in 
respect of the area of continental shelf constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory under the sea 
existed ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. That right was inherent. In order to 
exercise it, no special legal acts had to be performed.’ (International Court of Justice, 1969). 
20 Papastavridis (2020) presents a general discussion of the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey from 
an international law perspective. On the EEZ of Cyprus see, inter alia, Jiménez García-Carriazo (2020) and Dokos 




Agreement and even paralleled it with the Turkish occupation of the northern part of 
Cyprus. Moreover, he Europeanised the conflict by saying ‘we will confront all these issues 
(...) as Greece, but also as Europe’ and stated that it has to be dealt with at the diplomatic 
level (Hellenic Parliament, 2019a). 
This first reaction from the Speaker thus fully condemned and rejected the illegal Turkish-
Libyan MoU in no uncertain terms, although at the same time it was intentionally vague, so 
as to allow room for manoeuvre to Greek foreign policy. The mentioning of the Cyprus issue 
possibly aims at highlighting the gravity of the matter and indicates that Greece is willing to 
engage in a long-term legal and diplomatic battle to annul the Agreement. The choice of 
Europeanization is important in diplomatic rhetoric, both in a legal (link to the widespread 
international acceptance of UNCLOS) and strategic sense (positioning the issue as an 
international conflict rather than a bilateral one). The fact that this ‘European approach’ to 
the Agreement attracted significant support is visible in one third of the recorded 
statements. 
Only days later, on 3 December, speaking at the Conference of Parliamentary Committees 
for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), Angelos Syrigos,21 a Greek 
MP for New Democracy (ND) and an international law and foreign policy expert by 
profession, emphasised that this accord violated UNCLOS by depriving large Greek islands of 
their rights to a maritime zone, especially to a Continental Shelf, as well as to a territorial 
sea of up to 12 nautical miles. The accord limits them to just 6 nautical miles of territorial 
sea. He also called upon the European Union to take action (Hellenic Parliament, 2019b). 
This exact position was repeated again the next day by ND MP Konstantinos Gkioulekas, 
Chairman of the Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic 
Parliament at a meeting with the German Ambassador in Greece, Ernst Wolfgang Reichel 
(Hellenic Parliament, 2019c). 
On the same day, Andreas Koutsoumbas, a ND MP and member in the aforementioned 
committee, talking in the Interparliamentary Meeting of the Committees on Foreign Affairs 
of the European and National Parliaments, stressed the importance of any aspiring EU 
members to respect international law, in a clear reference to Turkey current status as a 
candidate member since accession negotiations began in late 2005 (Hellenic Parliament, 
2019d). 
On 12 December 2019, as a result of the Turkish-Libyan MoU, as well as Greece´s diplomatic 
reactions –the most important being the expulsion of the Libyan (GNA) Ambassador in 
Greece (Wintour, 2019)–, the Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Constantine Tassoulas met 
with the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Tobruk, Aguila Saleh Eissa. In a post-
meeting statement, Speaker Tassoulas underlined that the Libyan House had also 
condemned the Agreement, seeing it as ‘legally non-existent’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2019e). 
The actions of those days showed that Greece aligned with the Tobruk-based 
administration, at least on this specific issue, yet at the same time there was no explicit 
recognition of it as the legitimate government and representative of Libya. However, the 
explicit rejection of the agreement by the Speaker of the Libyan Parliament is a reason 
enough for this diplomatic move of Greece to de facto endorse the Tobruk-based 
Administration, when months later there were discussions about the possibility of opening a 
Greek Consulate Office in Benghazi, but also about the potential of re-opening negotiations 
 
21 Angelos Syrigos (MP) was also President of the Greek-Libyan parliamentary friendship group during the 




for a Greek-Libyan maritime boundary delimitation agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2020). 
Following this meeting, in a TV interview with the National Broadcaster ERT, the Speaker of 
the Hellenic Parliament made a reference to the Greek Government’s decision to move the 
issue to the UN Security Council, since:  
‘(…) the Security Council has a much more decisive competence regarding any 
destabilisation in the world. Turkey is now, officially denounced as an agitator for 
[threatening] international stability in a disputed region of the world and not only for 
bothering Greece.’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2019f). 
At this point, it needs to be emphatically noted that the Hellenic Parliament is an 
autonomous institution within the Greek democratic system and its Speaker enjoys the 
privilege to speak on its behalf. At the same time, it is recognised that differentiated 
parliamentary positions vis-à-vis the official diplomatic line could be prove problematic for 
the national interest. Therefore, the Parliament´s organisation foresees the existence of a 
permanent diplomatic office directly attached to the Speaker. The position of the diplomatic 
advisor to the Speaker is assumed by an experienced diplomat. Therefore, on such an 
important issue, there is little doubt that there is strong coordination between the Foreign 
Ministry and the Vouli. 
Still talking about the Turkish-Libyan Agreement, the Speaker referred to the Morocco 
December 2015 agreement,22 saying that it ‘commits the [Libyan] Government to not 
undertake any initiative with any foreign actor that would excessively bind the country’. 
Hence, he concludes, the MoU cannot bind Libya (Hellenic Parliament, 2019f). 
The above refers to the rejection of the Agreement by the Tobruk-based Administration, 
because it did not follow Libya´s constitutional arrangements for ratifying international 
agreements. Therefore, Greek parliamentarians raised this key issue, something that the 
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis also stated in a letter sent to the President of the 
UN Security Council on 4 September 2020, ‘(…) this Memorandum was never endorsed by 
the Libyan Parliament as required by article 8, paragraph 2 (f) of the Skhirat Agreement of 
2015, and was concluded despite the fact that the two countries have no common maritime 
boundaries.’ (United Nations Security Council, 2020). 
Speaking at the Hellenic Parliament EU Affairs Committee on 17 December 2019, ND MP 
and Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Miltiadis Varvitsiotis claimed that not only the 
MoU was null and void, but that it also had no legal effects on third parties, i.e. on the rights 
of the Greek islands to their own maritime zones: ‘(...) the memorandum of understanding 
infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, is inconsistent with the Law of the Sea 
and may not produce legal effects for third states.’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2019g). 
The issue of this illegal agreement was also highlighted by ND MP Maximos Charakopoulos, 
Chairman of the Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and Justice, on 17 
January 2020 during an official visit to Czechia. While meeting with members of the Czech 
 
22 This refers to the 17 December 2015 Skhirat Agreement signed in Morocco. The UN welcomed it as a step 
forward because it included ‘[r]epresentatives from a broad range of Libyan society (…) on forming a national 







Government and Parliament, he stated that this agreement infringed upon the sovereign 
rights of Greece and Cyprus regarding their maritime zones (Hellenic Parliament, 2020a). 
On 22 January 2020, in a meeting of the Delegations of Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committees of the Southern European Union Parliaments, Angelos Syrigos emphasised once 
more the illegality of the Agreement as ‘(…) it violates sovereign rights of third countries, 
and is inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, therefore 
having no legal implications for third parties (…)’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2020b). 
The main issue of a televised interview aired from the Hellenic Parliament TV on 30 January 
2020 was also the–then–recently signed Turkish-Libyan MoU: in it, Marietta Giannakou, ND 
MP, and Sia Anagnostopoulou, MP for the Major Opposition Party SYRIZA, both MPs showed 
a remarkable concord – given the historic experience of fierce political tension between 
governing and major opposition parties in Greece (Hellenic Parliament, 2020c).23 This can be 
explained from a point of ‘national unity’, when it comes to foreign affairs of major 
significance.  
This joint political bloc was also clearly visible in another instance of that period, the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly on 19 February 2020. As noted after the event, the Hellenic 
Parliament inter-party representation, consisting of Marietta Giannakou (ND), Manousos 
Voloudakis (ND), Theodora Tzakri (SYRIZA), Marios Katsis (SYRIZA), and Andreas Loverdos 
(Kinima Allagis), made a joint statement in which they not only briefly repeated Greece´s 
positions: they also explained their protest move when they all left the meeting room due to 
unacceptable behaviour on behalf of the Chairman-in-office (Hellenic Parliament, 2020d). 
This rather uncommon reaction in IPIs practice (i.e: an openly discriminatory attitude of a 
presiding officer towards a member state) – was broadcast and commented numerous 
times by national media, thus contributing to a strengthening of the parliament’s image in 
Greece and beyond.    
In his address, in Greek,24 to the 14th Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Mediterranean on 20 February 2020 held in Athens, Speaker Constantine Tassoulas, talking 
about Turkish actions and the Agreement, stated that: 
‘(…) there can be no tangible progress in the relations between neighbouring 
countries, without the full respect of International Law, including the International 
Law of the Sea, as well as the International Conventions.’ (Hellenic Parliament, 
2020e). 
The repeating mentioning of the International Law of the Sea clearly shows the intention of 
Greece to weaken the position of the Turkish side as much as possible, as Ankara is not a 
party to UNCLOS. Using strong language in front of homologues from countries around the 
Mediterranean See, he also expressed that such actions ‘threaten peace and stability in the 
eastern Mediterranean.’ (Hellenic Parliament, 2020e). Therefore, the Greek stance on that 
particular issue is clear: to use all diplomatic means at its disposal, including those of 
parliamentary diplomacy, to put its message across. 
Thus, this strategy continued over time. On 24 February 2020, ND MP Dimitrios Kairidis, First 
Deputy Chairman of the EU Affairs Committee of the Hellenic Parliament met with Deputy 
 
23 Methodologically, we regard both statements as one, since they were recorded during the same 
discussion/event. Obviously, this is also true for the joint MP statement during the following the 19 February 
2020 NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  




Chairman of the EU Affairs Committee of the French Senate Simon Sutour, a Socialist. 
Kairidis’ statement repeated again the Greek position that the MoU has no legitimacy and 
no implications, as it contradicts the international law, geography, and common sense. He 
then called the EU to develop a strategy against Turkey´s provocations, in particular by 
highlighting the important role of France in this aspect and the need for the latter to take 
initiatives on that matter (Hellenic Parliament, 2020f). 
On 27 February 2020, in his meeting with the Dutch Ambassador in Greece, Stella Ronner-
Grubačić, Konstantinos Gkioulekas, ND MP and the Chairman of the Committee on National 
Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament, pointed out that the Agreement 
ignores the rights of two coastal states, Greece and Cyprus, by disregarding the Law of the 
Sea in general (Hellenic Parliament, 2020g).  
Finally, ND MP Anastasios Chatzivasileiou, member of the Delegation of the Hellenic 
Parliament at the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP), raised also the issue of 
Turkey violating the arms embargo imposed in Libya by a United Nations’ Security Council 
Resolution. He then called on the EU for a ‘Mediterranean-wide’ co-operation and common 
action against Libya, within the framework of ‘European values’ and international law 
(Hellenic Parliament, 2020h).25  
 
5.2. Digital dimension 
Once these more traditional in form parliamentary reactions have been presented 
empirically, the paper will now address both how the parliament has made use of its digital 
means in the case of the Turkey-Libya MoU. The authors point out that the vast majority of 
the press releases are available only in Greek; out of the 15 used here, only seven are 
available in English and French (the other languages that the official website of the Hellenic 
Parliament is available in) but mainly in the form of a picture and a legend. Only one 
statement is placed in both English and French, the speech of Speaker Tassoulas to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, while the meeting at the South 
Mediterranean Foreign Affairs and National Defence Committees is only translated into 
English, despite the fact that no English-speaking country is part of the that Group, while 
France is its most important member.  
In general, it could be a sign of week prioritisation from the side of the Hellenic Parliament 
to externalise its actions beyond an exclusively Greek speaking area, i.e. Greece and Cyprus. 
In this regard, is can be noted that there is an informal directive to express themselves using 
the Greek language, an institutional option that is related with insistence in the historicity of 
the Greek language and culture. This is to be applied wherever possible, but there can be 
deviations due to practical issues, e.g. unavailable interpretation during webinars. But it also 
constitutes a problem of not putting much emphasis on the issue of international meetings 
that are usually conducted either in English or in French, the two de facto working languages 
in EU foreign policy. After all, out of the 15 statements above, 11 are directed to an 
international audience, thus falling into the category of parliamentary diplomacy. Last, but 
not least, although the Hellenic Parliament operates an English website dedicated to 
informing the Greek diaspora, none of these statements, however much important they 
were, were ever included in this network. 
 




Another important issue to note is the use of social media, primarily Twitter, as the Hellenic 
Parliament does not operate other social media accounts, e.g. on Facebook or LinkedIn. It 
does have an Instagram account (@parliamentoffice), but was not evaluated for the 
purpose of this study due to the very nature of the medium, i.e. it is designed to share visual 
information rather that text. Another remark is the fact that the Hellenic Parliament only 
tweets in Greek and places a headline and a photo, along a press release link. This therefore 
amounts to what could be seen as parliamentary social media presence being not active, 
but rather passive – with the twitter account solely working as an ‘aggregator’ of press 
releases. Regarding the statements used above, out of the 15 in total, only eight were 
available on Twitter. Also, although for most statements only a headline and a photo are 
available in English and French –two essential parts of any tweet nonetheless– there still is 
no activity in tweeting in those two foreign languages. In relation to the actual statements 
used in this paper, it is worth mentioning that only statements with a direct reference to the 
agreement were chosen. There were additional statements by parliamentarians that 
‘condemned Turkish aggression’ in general, without clear reference to the agreement. 
Evaluation of such vague statements would spread the width of this study beyond its main 
focus; hence, there was a firm decision to narrow it down to direct mentioning of the 
agreement.  
Finally, during the period examined, there were multiple meetings with representatives26 of 
France, Israel, Cyprus, Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary 
Association (WHIA). However, in none of them was there any reference to the 
Turkish/Libyan Agreement, despite the potential to internationalise this issue even further. 
Below the results of the statistical analysis of the recorded statements.  
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the statements in terms of the level of intervention. 
According to our findings, four of them were made by the Speaker, four by the Committee 
Chairs and seven by MPs. This shows a balanced approach, with all parliamentary levels 
participating. It is worth mentioning that one of the MP statements was made in front of the 
EU Affairs Committee by Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, a Minister. There, he spoke as a 
governmental representative, talking about the actions of the Hellenic Government, rather 
as a parliamentarian. Hence, if his statement is excluded for methodological reasons, it 
could be argued that there is an even greater balance in the statements per actor. 
 
 





Figure 1. Number of statements per actor   
 
Figure 2 depicts the timeline of statements, in order to explore the frequency of occurrence. 
It is interesting to note the prompt and ‘front-loaded’ reaction of the Hellenic Parliament. 
Out of the 15 statements in total, seven of them were made in December, three in January, 
four in February and only one in March. In early March, due to the institutional lockdown for 
the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an abrupt stop in almost early parliamentary activity. 
This also affected parliamentary diplomacy, as no other statements relevant to the 
agreement could be detected for several months (until June 2020) on the parliament’s 
digital channels. This is the reason for choosing the timeframe of this study. 
 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of examined interventions  
 
The choice of the different channels can be seen in Figure 3. Almost all Statements can be 
found on the parliamentary portal, i.e. 14 out of 15, while only half of them, i.e. eight out of 
15, were propagated via Twitter. Despite the global outreach of web broadcasting, the 
Hellenic Parliament TV did not organise but a single relevant debate, on 30 January 2020, 
which is available on YouTube. In the studied case, the Hellenic Parliament did not make use 
of the other digital channels, though available, that are at its disposal. Our final finding is 
related to the political origin of the statements. These were expressed by overall 13 MPs, 10 




statements originate overwhelmingly from MPs from the governing party, there are clear 
indications that the ‘national line’ is expressed by opposition parties. 
 
 
Figure 3. Breakdown of statements according to digital medium 
 
 
It needs to be noted that the rest of the parliamentary parties, i.e. the Communist Party of 
Greece and Mera25, are notably absent. This could be attributed to the fact that their 
representatives do not frequently assume leading positions in parliamentary bodies nor do 
they regularly participate in official delegations.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations  
The current paper has captured and studied the Hellenic Parliament’s primary digital 
response to the November 2019 Turkey-Libya (internationally recognised government) 
memorandum. As expected, the Speaker has made his voice heard, by clearly rejecting the 
memorandum on many occasions, namely interviews, official meetings, assemblies and 
statements. It is traditional for parliamentary Speakers to act as official spokespersons of 
their respective institutions´ stance on international affairs. For instance, in the case of 
France, Maus (2012, p. 30) describes the Presidents of the Assemblée Nationale and of the 
Sénat as the very ‘embodiment’ of French parliamentary diplomacy. 
This study has also shown that the Vouli´s Chairs of parliamentary committees covering this 
subject have also complemented this rejection of the Turkish-Libyan agreement in their 
official capacity: when meeting with ambassadors, parliamentarians and officials from EU 
member states, as well as within EU forums. Lastly, MPs, from the ruling majority and the 
pro-EU opposition, have made personal or joint statements in various EU forums or in the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, therefore, showing a constant and systematic parliamentary 




Thus, a common stance is clearly visible across the major political spectrum regarding the 
outright rejection of the said agreement as ‘null and void’. A fair balance is visible in the 
interventions at all levels, i.e. Speaker, committee Chairs and MPs. This could be interpreted 
as a well-thought and robust reaction of the Hellenic Parliament. The timing of these 
interventions can be regarded as ‘front-loaded’, as almost half of them (seven out of 15) 
where within a month after the signing of the memorandum. This was an expected 
‘reactive' approach, based on ‘instinct' rather than planning.  
Yet, during this period, apart from the recorded events in this text, there was a series of 
other additional meetings that one would think to be significant from a diplomacy point of 
view. These were the meetings with the World Hellenic Inter-parliamentary Association 
(WHIA) and representatives/ambassadors from Cyprus, France, Israel and Tunisia. Here, the 
absence of any public reference to the said agreement seems rather strange, which leaves 
plenty of room to assume that there the Greek side has opted to handle this politically 
sensitive topic primarily at the diplomatic level. In other words, there is still a lot of 
improvement in the coordination and follow-up parliamentary activities of Greek 
parliamentary diplomacy. This absence is more surprising considering that, as noted above, 
the official state diplomacy and the declared parliamentary diplomacy fully coincide on the 
issue under investigation. There is no discrepancy between the two and therefore it would 
be expected to see more coordinated efforts in that direction. 
As far as emphasis on how digital channels, as well as several message attributes, have been 
used in this case study goes, it is possible to conclude the following: all but one appears at 
the official parliamentary portal, with around half of them being communicated via Twitter. 
Other channels, though available, were not used to propagate the Greek positions. For 
instance, the following two could be used in the future: the newsletter for the Greek 
diaspora –which appears also in English– and the e-Magazine provide ample and regular 
opportunities for customised information of specific target audiences.  
Outside the Greek-Cypriot axis, the choice of language is an important issue – especially for 
a country whose official language, in spite of its long historic tradition and culture, is only 
spoken by a very small minority in today’s world. The Vouli´s press releases are provided in 
English and French, but in most cases only the title is translated and some pictures made 
available. Furthermore, tweets appear only with the Greek title and contain a link to the 
original press release in the portal. Not every press release gets twitted though. The 
recorded broad use of Greek is consistent with an informal directive to parliamentarians to 
use their native language when on the international stage. Here, it would no doubt be 
important to use English and French in a most systematic way. Not only because both 
languages are the EU´s CFSP vernaculars but also two of the UN’s official tongues. It might 
also be useful to extend this practice to Spanish, another world language, justifying it under 
the wider Europeanisation process of Greek foreign policy. With digital revolution, it is even 
easier to, for instance, retweet in various languages. 
The specific case study handled by the paper could also be used as a model for future 
research avenues, e.g.: analyses of parliamentary positioning on the more recent Greek-
Italian, Greek-Egyptian and Greek-Albanian agreements on maritime boundaries. Moreover, 
as the digital revolution is going to affect every form of parliamentary diplomacy, such as 
the friendship groups, more efforts in soft diplomacy actions to bridge long foreign affairs 
gaps will also need to materialise. The Hellenic Republic, with its multiple open diplomacy 




of operation and cooperation for its numerous friendship groups to work in tandem, if not 
to complement, official diplomatic channels. In this context, and despite recent tensions as 
the ones generated by the agreement under study here, one might discuss the possibility to 
set up a Friendship Group with Turkey, a move considered impossible for a long time. 
Technically, such a step would reinforce existing dynamics and support existing and on-
going bilateral exchange. 
Greek and Turkish parliamentarians already meet regularly in numerous IPIs (e.g.: IPU, UfM 
PA, PAM, NATO PA, OSCE PA and PACE, indicatively). In that respect, translating Greek 
parliamentary declarations and statements into Turkish (by proxy users or national think 
tanks), would be an original measure worth investigating in detail as it would facilitate an 
additional channel of dialogue between the two countries, including between its respective 
civil societies.27 At the end of the day, parliamentarians ‘are representatives of a people, 
which perhaps gives them more political weight than NGOs, but at the same time their 
actions do not necessarily commit a government, which can make it easier for them to 
operate in particularly sensitive situations’ (Weisglas and de Boer, 2007, 96). Indeed, 
flexibility, informality, search for compromises are not only characteristics of diplomatic 
practice in general, they represent also those of parliamentary diplomacy (Stavridis, 2017; 
2019). 
It is also not unheard of that individual parliamentarians attempt actions that may cross 
official foreign policy lines. A parliamentary code of contact appears in this regard as the 
best possible option to homogenise and bundle individual and random quasi-diplomatic 
moves. Given the pluralism and wide spread geographic distribution of personal actions 
from parliamentarians, such guidelines could potentially impact other forms of diplomacy 
such as diaspora diplomacy (Stone and Douglas, 2018) or Olympic diplomacy (Beacom, 
2012). 
This paper has therefore offered a number of preliminary findings on a still under-
researched area of academic interest. As such, it represents both a pilot-study and a 
possible framework for future work, especially in a comparative context, both spatial and 
chronological. Finally, special interest should be given to the way Greek parliamentary 
diplomacy has used new digital technologies in recent times. Still it is not clear if the 
response presented here constitutes a particular model for parliamentary diplomacy, such 
as the ones shown by Manor (2016). Vice versa, further study, possibly of comparative 
nature, is necessary to determine if lessons learned for digital diplomacy can find their way 
into legislatures. Ultimately, it is hoped that this contribution will lead to more academic 








27 In this respect, it can be noted that the Hellenic Parliament has a long-term language teaching program for 
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Appendix (The original statement appears in grey) 




‘I would say that this agreement on 
the one hand shows how unrelated to 
history, geography and any concept 
of international law the provocation 
of Turkey is. But we must not rest 
on these words, since also other 
things that Turkey has done were 
unhistorical and challenging 
international law, and yet, based on 
the "blessed are the holders" 
[principle], such as the occupation of 
Cyprus, [these things] keep on 
torturing us being a wound on the 
body of Hellenism. Therefore, we 
will confront all these issues in the 
diplomatic and in any other decisive 
field, as Greece, but also as Europe.’ 
‘Θα έλεγα ότι αυτό το σύμφωνο 
αφενός δείχνει την ανιστόρητη, 
αγεωγράφητη και εκτός κάθε 
έννοιας Διεθνούς Δικαίου 
προκλητικότητα της Τουρκίας. 
Αλλά δεν πρέπει να 
επαναπαυόμαστε σε αυτές τις 
λέξεις, γιατί και άλλα πράγματα 
που έκανε η Τουρκία ήταν 
ανιστόρητα και εκτός Διεθνούς 
Δικαίου, και εντούτοις, με βάση το 
"μακάριοι οι κατέχοντες", όπως η 
κατοχή της Κύπρου, εξακολουθούν 
να μας βασανίζουν και να 
αποτελούν πληγή στο σώμα του 
Ελληνισμού. Συνεπώς όλα αυτά τα 
πράγματα θα τα αντιμετωπίσουμε 
και στο διπλωματικό και σε κάθε 
άλλο αποφασιστικό πεδίο ως 
Ελλάδα αλλά και ως Ευρώπη.’ 
3/12/2019 Aggelos Syrigos 
‘Mr. Syrigos (...) informed the 
Conference about the illegal actions 
of Turkey within the Cypriot 
maritime zones, as well as the 
signing of the illegal Memorandum 
of Understanding between Turkey 
and the Tripoli-based Government 
of Libya. Mr. Syrigos underlined 
that this Memorandum is a blatant 
violation of the Law of the Sea, as it 
fully ignores the continental shelf of 
heavily populated and territorially 
large Aegean Islands, by limiting 
their territorial sea to 6 nautical 
miles, and called on the European 
Union to take action.’ 
‘Ο κ. Συρίγος (...) ενημέρωσε τη 
Διάσκεψη για τις παράνομες 
ενέργειες της Τουρκίας στις 
κυπριακές θαλάσσιες ζώνες, καθώς 
επίσης και την υπογραφή του 
παράνομου Μνημονίου 
Κατανόησης ανάμεσα στην 
Τουρκία και την κυβέρνηση της 
Τρίπολης της Λιβύης. Ο κ. Συρίγος 
υπογράμμισε ότι το Μνημόνιο 
αποτελεί κατάφωρη παραβίαση του 
Δικαίου της Θάλασσας, καθώς 
αγνοεί πλήρως την υφαλοκρηπίδα 
μεγάλων σε πληθυσμό και έκταση 
νησιών του Αιγαίου, περιορίζοντας 
την αιγιαλίτιδα ζώνη τους στα 6 
ναυτικά μίλια, και ζήτησε από την 





(...) the Greek Parliamentarian 
scolded Turkey's provocative stance 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, noting 
that the recent agreement between 
Turkey and Libya regarding the 
demarcation of maritime boundaries 
constitutes a clear violation of 
international law. 
(...) ο Έλληνας βουλευτής 
καυτηρίασε την προκλητική στάση 
της Τουρκίας στην Ανατολική 
Μεσόγειο, επισημαίνοντας ότι η 
πρόσφατη συμφωνία μεταξύ 
Τουρκίας και Λιβύης για τον 
καθορισμό των θαλασσίων 
συνόρων αποτελεί κατάφωρη 




He also referred to the need for 
countries engaged in accession or 
pre-accession negotiations to respect 
international law, given that "we 
have recently seen a clear violation 
of International Law and the Law of 
the Sea in the wider Mediterranean 
region. 
Αναφέρθηκε επιπλέον στην ανάγκη 
οι χώρες που βρίσκονται σε 
ενταξιακές ή προενταξιακές 
διαπραγματεύσεις να σέβονται το 
Διεθνές Δίκαιο, με δεδομένο ότι 
"βρισκόμαστε τον τελευταίο καιρό 
σε μια κατάφωρη παραβίαση του 




της Θάλασσας στην ευρύτερη 




‘This briefing regarding the 
problems and challenges that Libya 
is facing is of particular importance 
due to the fact that Mr. Aguilla 
Saleh Eissa has very recently taken a 
stand -with legal documentation and 
unequivocally- for a serious issue of 
concern for his country, that is the 
recent agreement signed between 
Turkey and the Tripoli-based 
Government, an agreement which he 
considers absolutely condemnable 
and legally non-existent.’ 
‘Αυτή η ενημέρωση, για τα 
προβλήματα και τις προκλήσεις που 
αντιμετωπίζει η Λιβύη, αποκτά 
πρόσθετη σημασία για εμάς ενόψει 
του γεγονότος ότι ο κ. Aguila Saleh 
Eissa πολύ πρόσφατα έχει 
τοποθετηθεί, με νομική τεκμηρίωση 
και απερίφραστα, για ένα σοβαρό 
ζήτημα που απασχολεί τη χώρα 
του, δηλαδή την πρόσφατη 
συμφωνία που υπεγράφη ανάμεσα 
στην Τουρκία και την κυβέρνηση 
της Τρίπολης, συμφωνία την οποία 





‘Turkey's destabilising behaviour in 
the Eastern Mediterranean is the 
reason why Greece has sent a letter 
not only to the UN Secretary 
General, but also to the UN Security 
Council, because the Security 
Council has a much more decisive 
competence regarding any 
destabilisation in the world. Turkey 
is now, officially denounced as an 
agitator for [threatening] 
international stability in a disputed 
region of the world and not only for 
bothering Greece.’, ‘The December 
2015 agreement, concluded in 
Morocco, (...) commits the 
Government to not undertake any 
initiative with any foreign actor that 
would excessively bind the country. 
That is not to make what is called an 
agreement, and this is the reason 
why it can only sign MoUs. And 
here is the key, (...) the Libyan 
Parliament, through its President, 
reveals in the letter to the Secretary 
General of the UN, with legal 
arguments, citing the agreement of 
2015, that this is a memorandum 
(MoU) that does not bind the Nation 
of Libya (...)’ 
‘Η αποσταθεροποιητική 
συμπεριφορά της Τουρκίας στην 
Ανατολική Μεσόγειο είναι και η 
αιτία που η Ελλάδα έστειλε όχι 
μόνο στον Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ, αλλά και 
στο Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας του 
ΟΗΕ επιστολή, γιατί το Συμβούλιο 
Ασφαλείας έχει πολύ πιο 
αποφασιστική αρμοδιότητα εν 
σχέσει με την αποσταθεροποίηση 
σε μια περιοχή της υφηλίου. Η 
Τουρκία λοιπόν, επισήμως πλέον, 
καταγγέλλεται ως ταραξίας της 
διεθνούς σταθερότητος σε μία 
επίμαχη περιοχή του κόσμου και 
όχι μόνον ως ενοχλούσα την 
Ελλάδα.’, ‘Η συμφωνία του 
Δεκεμβρίου 2015, που συνήφθη 
στο Μαρόκο, ... δεσμεύει την 
Κυβέρνηση να μη λαμβάνει με τον 
ξένο παράγοντα καμία 
πρωτοβουλία με την οποία να 
δεσμεύεται υπέρμετρα η χώρα. Να 
μην κάνει δηλαδή αυτό που λέμε 
συμφωνίες, γι’ αυτό και μπορεί να 
κάνει μόνο MOU. Kαι εδώ είναι το 
κλειδί, γι’ αυτό και το Κοινοβούλιο 
της Λιβύης, διά του Προέδρου του, 
αποκαλύπτει στην επιστολή προς 
τον Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ, με νομικά 
επιχειρήματα, επικαλούμενο και τη 
συμφωνία του 2015, ότι πρόκειται 
για μνημόνιο (MOU) που δεν 
δεσμεύει το έθνος της Λιβύης (...)’ 
17/12/2019 Miltiadis Varvitsiotis 
‘(...) the memorandum of 
understanding infringes upon the 
sovereign rights of third states, is 
inconsistent with the Law of the Sea 
and may not produce legal effects 
for third states.’ 
‘(…) το μνημόνιο συνεννόησης 
παραβιάζει τα κυριαρχικά 
δικαιώματα τρίτων κρατών, δεν 
συνάδει με το Δίκαιο της 
Θάλασσας και δεν μπορεί να 





‘In addition, he scolded (...) the 
Turkish provocation that has been 
‘Επίσης, καυτηρίασε (...) την 




noted down lately with regards to 
the contestation of the Greek and 
Cypriot EEZ after the signing of the 
Turkey-Libya Memorandum.’ 
καταγράφεται το τελευταίο 
διάστημα σε σχέση με την 
αμφισβήτηση της ελληνικής και της 
κυπριακής ΑΟΖ μετά την 
υπογραφή του Μνημονίου 
Τουρκίας-Λιβύης.’ 
22/1/2020 Aggelos Syrigos 
He specifically referred to Turkey's 
provocative behavior in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and emphasized that 
the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Governments of Libya 
and Turkey on the delimitation of 
the Exclusive Economic Zones in 
the Mediterranean Sea violates 
sovereign rights of third countries, 
and is inconsistent with the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, therefore having no legal 
implications for third parties, a 
statement also recorded in the Joint 
Declaration of the meeting. 
Ιδιαίτερη αναφορά έκανε στην 
προκλητική συμπεριφορά της 
Τουρκίας στην Ανατολική 
Μεσόγειο και υπογράμμισε πως το 
Μνημόνιο Κατανόησης μεταξύ των 
κυβερνήσεων της Λιβύης και της 
Τουρκίας για την οριοθέτηση των 
Αποκλειστικών Οικονομικών 
Ζωνών στη Μεσόγειο Θάλασσα, 
παραβιάζει τα κυριαρχικά 
δικαιώματα τρίτων κρατών, δεν 
συνάδει με το Δίκαιο της 
Θάλασσας και δεν μπορεί να 
επιφέρει νομικές συνέπειες για 
τρίτα κράτη, αναφορά η οποία 
αποτυπώθηκε και στην Κοινή 





MG: ‘(...) France will be on our side 
and I suppose that during the 
European Council, in which for me 
Greece must put on the table the 
implementation of sanctions that 
have been decided, because it is not 
only about the announcement that 
“sanctions are imposed”, it is for the 
sanctions to be implemented.’ / 
SA: ‘And a last point Ms Giannakou 
made a reference to, I am also in 
favour of sanctions, European ones, 
and not only in their dimension of 
“what are we going to impose on 
Turkey” (...), sanctions also oblige 
member states of the European 
Union (...)’ 
MG: ‘(…) Η Γαλλία θα είναι στο 
πλευρό μας και υποθέτω ότι κατά 
την διάρκεια του Ευρωπαϊκού 
Συμβουλίου, που για μένα η 
Ελλάδα πρέπει να θέσει επί τάπητος 
την εφαρμογή των κυρώσεων που 
έχουν αποφασιστεί, διότι δεν είναι 
μόνο η ανακοίνωση ότι 
“επιβάλλονται κυρώσεις”, είναι να 
αρχίσουν να επιβάλλονται οι 
κυρώσεις.” SA: ‘Κι ένα τελευταίο 
σημείο, που ανέφερε η κυρία 
Γιαννάκου, κι εγώ είμαι υπέρ των 
κυρώσεων, των ευρωπαϊκών, και 
όχι μόνο στη διάσταση του “τι θα 
επιβάλλουμε στη Τουρκία”(…), οι 
κυρώσεις όμως υποχρεώνουν και τα 






Tzakri, Marios Katsis, 
Andreas Loverdos  
During the work of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels, 
as the Hellenic Delegation, we 
emphasised the issue of the Turkey-
Libya agreement, which violates 
international law and the sovereign 
rights of Greece. In the discussion 
that followed after the Turkish 
NATO Ambassador had expressed 
his position, we both sought to 
provide answers regarding the issue 
of the violation of the sovereign 
rights of Greece and to inform our 
colleagues from other NATO 
member-states about Turkey's illegal 
actions and the explosive risks they 
pose to the region. We especially 
stressed the fact that Turkey, via its 
Κατά τη διάρκεια των εργασιών της 
Κοινοβουλευτικής Συνέλευσης του 
ΝΑΤΟ στις Βρυξέλλες, ως 
Ελληνική Αντιπροσωπεία θέσαμε 
με έμφαση το ζήτημα της 
συμφωνίας Τουρκίας-Λιβύης η 
οποία παραβιάζει το Διεθνές Δίκαιο 
και τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της 
Ελλάδας. 
Στη συζήτηση που ακολούθησε 
μετά από τοποθέτηση του 
Πρεσβευτή της Τουρκίας στο 
ΝΑΤΟ, αφ’ ενός ζητήσαμε να 
λάβουμε απαντήσεις σχετικά με το 
ζήτημα της παραβίασης των 
κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων της 
Ελλάδας και αφ’ ετέρου επιδιώξαμε 




agreement with Libya, is 
consciously violating the principle 
of international law that the islands 
are taken into consideration in 
determining the EEZ. We also 
stressed that we have already writing 
samples from Ankara in another 
field, on the practical utilisation of 
its legal stunts: Turkey is already 
drilling in the EEZ of Cyprus on 
sites that were allocated for research 
through international tender to oil 
companies of NATO member-states, 
such as France and Italy. The 
Chairman-in-office systematically 
interrupted our statements and 
questions, thus hindering the 
development of our positions. Even 
being interrupted, we completed our 
positions [and] our Delegation left 
the Room in protest, denouncing the 
attitude of the Chairman-in-office. 
συναδέλφους μας των λοιπών 
χωρών μελών του ΝΑΤΟ για τις 
παράνομες ενέργειες της Τουρκίας 
και τους κινδύνους ανάφλεξης που 
προκαλούν στην περιοχή. 
Αναδείξαμε ιδιαίτερα το γεγονός 
ότι η Τουρκία με τη συμφωνία της 
με τη Λιβύη συνειδητά παραβιάζει 
την αρχή του Διεθνούς Δικαίου ότι 
στον καθορισμό της ΑΟΖ 
λαμβάνονται υπ’ όψιν τα νησιά. 
Τονίσαμε δε ότι έχουμε ήδη 
δείγματα γραφής από την Άγκυρα, 
σε άλλο πεδίο, σχετικά με την 
πρακτική αξιοποίηση των νομικών 
της ακροβασιών: η Τουρκία ήδη 
διενεργεί γεωτρήσεις στην ΑΟΖ 
της Κύπρου σε οικόπεδα που με 
διεθνή διαγωνισμό δόθηκαν για 
έρευνα σε πετρελαϊκές εταιρείες 
κρατών μελών του ΝΑΤΟ όπως η 
Γαλλία και η Ιταλία. Ο 
Προεδρεύων των εργασιών 
συστηματικά μας διέκοπτε στις 
τοποθετήσεις και τις ερωτήσεις 
μας, εμποδίζοντας την ανάπτυξη 
των θέσεών μας. Αφού έστω και 
διακοπτόμενοι ολοκληρώσαμε τις 
τοποθετήσεις μας, η 
Αντιπροσωπεία μας αποχώρησε 
από την αίθουσα σε ένδειξη 
διαμαρτυρίας, καταγγέλλοντας τη 




 ‘(...) there can be no tangible 
progress in the relations between 
neighbouring countries, without the 
full respect of International Law, 
including the International Law of 
the Sea, as well as the International 
Conventions. Actions, which insist 
on questioning the sovereignty and 
the sovereign rights of Greece, 
undermine the basic principle of 
good neighbourly relations, 
contravene international law and 
seriously obstruct efforts towards a 
mutually beneficial relationship. For 
example, the memoranda that were 
signed between Turkey and Libya 
are null and void and cannot be 
implemented, while they threaten 
peace and stability in the eastern 
Mediterranean.’ 
‘(…) δεν μπορεί να υπάρξει απτή 
πρόοδος στις σχέσεις μεταξύ 
γειτονικών χωρών, χωρίς τον πλήρη 
σεβασμό του Διεθνούς Δικαίου, 
συμπεριλαμβανομένου του 
Διεθνούς Δικαίου της Θάλασσας, 
καθώς και των Διεθνών 
Συμβάσεων. Δράσεις που εμμένουν 
στην αμφισβήτηση της κυριαρχίας 
και των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων 
της Ελλάδας, υπονομεύουν τη 
βασική αρχή των σχέσεων καλής 
γειτονίας, παραβιάζουν το διεθνές 
δίκαιο και εμποδίζουν σοβαρά τις 
προσπάθειες για μια αμοιβαία 
επωφελής σχέση. Παραδείγματος 
χάριν, τα μνημόνια που 
υπεγράφησαν μεταξύ Τουρκίας και 
Λιβύης είναι άκυρα και κενά 
περιεχομένου και ανεφάρμοστα, 
ενώ απειλούν την ειρήνη και τη 
σταθερότητα στην ανατολική 
Μεσόγειο.’ 
24/2/2020 Dimitris Keridis 
(...) regarding the Turkey-Libya 
Agreement, Mr. Kairidis underlined 
that it violates international law, 
geography and logic, and stressed 
(…) σε ό,τι αφορά το Σύμφωνο 
Τουρκίας - Λιβύης, ο κ. Καιρίδης 
υπογράμμισε ότι παραβιάζει το 




that Europe should develop a more 
dynamic strategy in the face of the 
Turkish provocation, by calling on 
France to take initiatives on this 
issue. 
λογική και τόνισε ότι η Ευρώπη θα 
πρέπει να αναπτύξει μια πιο 
δυναμική στρατηγική μπροστά 
στην τουρκική προκλητικότητα, 
καλώντας τη Γαλλία να αναλάβει 




With regard to Turkey's provocative 
behaviour in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Aegean, the 
Greek Parliamentarian stressed that 
[Turkey] cannot blatantly violate the 
sovereign rights of Greece and 
Cyprus and added that the Turkey-
Libya Memorandum ignores the 
Law of the Sea.  
Σχετικά με την προκλητική 
συμπεριφορά της Τουρκίας στην 
Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και το 
Αιγαίο, ο Έλληνας βουλευτής 
τόνισε πως αυτή δεν μπορεί να 
παραβιάζει κατάφωρα τα 
κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της 
Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου και 
πρόσθεσε πως το Μνημόνιο 
Τουρκίας – Λιβύης αγνοεί το 




Special reference was made by Mr. 
Chatzivasileiou to the destabilising 
role that Turkey plays in Libya, by 
violating the agreed-upon arms 
embargo, as well as the sovereign 
rights of Greece, through the illegal 
Memorandum of Understanding 
with Libya for the maritime zones, 
and called upon the EU to cooperate 
in the Mediterranean and take joint 
action in Libya, on the basis of 
European principles and 
International Law. 
Ιδιαίτερη αναφορά έγινε από τον κ. 
Χατζηβασιλείου στον 
αποσταθεροποιητικό ρόλο που 
παίζει η Τουρκία στη Λιβύη, 
παραβιάζοντας το συμφωνηθέν 
εμπάργκο όπλων αλλά και τα 
κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της 
Ελλάδας, μέσω του παράνομου 
μνημονίου κατανόησης με την 
Λιβύη για τις θαλάσσιες ζώνες και 
κάλεσε την Ε.Ε. να συνεργαστεί 
στη Μεσόγειο και να αναλάβει 
κοινή δράση στη Λιβύη στη βάση 
των ευρωπαϊκών αρχών και του 
Διεθνούς Δικαίου. 
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